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Abstract: The paper explores Śaṅkara's position on autonomous consciousness, or cit, as 
the fundamental reality. As such, cit transcends subject/object duality, and Śaṅkara holds 
that consciousness is ultimately nirviṣayaka or non-intentional. I compare and contrast the 
Advaita view with the contemporary Phenomenological account, wherein consciousness 
is held to be essentially intentional, so that consciousness is always of or about some 
object or content, and where consciousness without an object is deemed conceptually 
impossible. 
 
                                    
                                       1. Absolute Consciousness 
The ontological monism of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta philosophy holds that pure 
consciousness, or cit, is the one fundamental substance. Thus reality is held to be 
ultimately singular in nature ‒ only pure consciousness genuinely exists and is 
ontologically autonomous, while all other phenomena which appear to exist are 
metaphysically dependent upon pure consciousness. On the Advaita analysis, cit is 
characterized as absolute and unconditioned awareness, as immutable and inactive, 
formless and without limiting characteristics.  
 
The history of Indian philosophy has been dynamically shaped by the longstanding 
controversies within Hinduism between its rival darśanas, and additionally between 
orthodox Hinduism and the heterodox schools of Buddhism and Jainism. On the topic of 
consciousness, one of the traditional issues of controversy revolved around the question 
of whether or not consciousness, by its essential nature, must be of an object. In the 
conventional terminology of disputation, this is the question of whether it is saviṣayaka or 
nirviṣayaka, i.e. intrinsically intentional or not. In addition the debate concerned the issue: 
does consciousness belong to someone ‒ does it have a ‘place’, or is it ‘placeless’, 
belonging to no one? In disputational terms, is it āśraya or nirāśraya?  
 
According to Śaṅkara's analysis, cit is both nirviṣayaka and nirāśraya, ultimately both 
non-intentional and belonging to no one. And because cit is held to be nirviṣayaka, pure 
consciousness itself is not dependent on any specific content or thing towards which it 
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appears to be directed. Consciousness of an object is a secondary and dependent mode, 
while the metaphysically fundamental mode is pure consciousness without an object. 
Hence in sharp contrast to the notions of consciousness prevalent in the Western 
Philosophical tradition, cit is intrinsically independent of any particular objects that may 
appear to occupy the field of consciousness.  
 
In common with the Advaita Vedānta stance, various forms of metaphysical Idealism in 
Western Philosophy also maintain a seemingly related form of ontological monism. 
However, it is important to highlight a crucial distinction here, since in contrast to 
Western Idealism, it would be incorrect to attribute to Śaṅkara the view that reality is 
essentially mental in nature. For Śaṅkara, the mind is not to be identified with pure 
consciousness or cit, and as noted above, he not only maintains that cit is not intrinsically 
directed towards an object, but also that it is nirāśraya, it has no place and belongs to no 
one. Hence it belongs to no particular mind, and pure consciousness itself must be sharply 
distinguished from that which is properly mental. 
 
Although non-dualistic, Advaita ontology is nonetheless committed to a radical 
discontinuity between unqualified, immutable, inactive cit on the one hand, versus the 
manifest world of attributes and form on the other. It is to this latter realm that the mind 
belongs. According to Śaṅkara, pure unconditioned awareness, as such, must be 
distinguished from the particular ‘states of consciousness’ associated with individual 
agents at specific times. It is these particular mental states that are directed towards 
objects, and where the apparent subject/object duality arises.  
 
                                    2.  Conscious Mental States 
Advaita monism maintains that the multifaceted, kaleidoscopic and everchanging 
material world is not ontologically autonomous, but rather is ultimately an ‘illusion’ 
sustained by māyā.  The individual human mind and body are manifestations of this 
illusory material realm. Movement and form are attributes of matter, and they are also 
attributes of thought, which is a manifestation of matter. In stark contrast, pure 
consciousness is intrinsically formless and unchanging. The cognitive processes that 
characterize the mind are governed by the unconscious and mechanical forces of the 
material realm, and to this extent mental phenomena are viewed in purely ‘naturalistic’ 
terms. The unfolding of thought forms is simply the result of appropriate transformations 
of the unconscious material world, the turning of the wheels of māyā. 
 
Dualistic ontologies have the pronounced difficulty of accounting for the seeming 
interaction between the two independent realms of existence. In Western forms of 
mind/matter dualism, the relation between material and mental substance drives the 
longstanding and deeply recalcitrant mind/body problem. Cartesian interactive dualism 
posits a causal link between mind and matter, and is thus seen to be at odds with physical 
conservation laws; while the non-interactive model of Leibniz and Locke requires divine 
intervention to maintain a ‘pre-established harmony’ between independent realms. In 
comparison, on the mind/consciousness dualism of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophical 
tradition, there is the concomitant difficulty of explaining how the absolute and 
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unconditioned consciousness of puruṣa can ‘interact’ with the unconscious 
material/mental structures of prakṛti to yield conscious mental states (see Schweizer 
1993, 2019 for further discussion). 
 
The Advaita philosophy of consciousness monism has a not dissimilar problem in 
accounting for the metaphysical status of the manifest world, and the relation between 
māyā and pure consciousness which makes it seem as if there are real conscious mental 
states. Śaṅkara invokes the subtle notion of ‘superimposition’ (adhyāsa) to explain the 
general projection of attributes and form onto unqualified and unconditioned basic reality. 
In the current discussion I will not delve into this recondite topic per se, but will instead 
just touch on the phenomenon of ‘conditioned’ consciousness in the context of individual 
mental states. As viewed from a ‘personal’ perspective within the phenomenal realm, 
pure cit is both transcendent but also immanent. In terms of immanence, pure 
consciousness persists in subjective phenomenal experience as the inner self or ‘witness’ 
(sākṣin) that constitutes the ultimate seat of awareness, the ground of sentience (see Gupta 
1998 for a detailed exploration). In this aspect, cit is compared to a light which is self-
luminous and self-revealing. Thus cit dwells ‘inside’ the mind as the self-luminous 
witness consciousness.  
 
From a more ‘outside’ or external perspective, when explaining how conscious mental 
states and events are possible, pure consciousness is again standardly compared to a light, 
which in this case illuminates the particular material configurations or ‘shapes’ assumed 
by the mind. Hence, on the Advaita account, thought processes and mental events are 
conscious only to the extent that they receive ‘illumination’ from cit. The sanskrit term 
‘manas’ is often translated directly as ‘mind’, although it is more accurate to observe that 
it is the combination of both manas and buddhi which roughly corresponds to the 
objective or impersonal mental faculties in Western philosophical discourse, and, as will 
be exposited below, it is buddhi which is centrally involved in the occurrence of 
particular conscious experiences. 
  
Manas is viewed essentially as an organ, the special organ of cognition, just as the eyes 
are the special organs of sight. Indeed, manas is held to be intimately connected with 
perception, since the raw data supplied by the senses must be ordered and categorized 
with respect to a conceptual/linguistic scheme before various objects can be perceived as 
members of their respective categories, and as inhabiting a world characterized by the 
systematic and distinguishable attributes with which sense experience is normally 
imbued. This imposition of conceptual/linguistic structure on the field of raw sensation is 
one of the basal activities of manas, and forms the distinction between brute sensation 
(nirvikalpaka) as opposed to differentiated perception (savikalpaka).  
 
In addition to its perceptual activities, manas is held to be responsible for the cognitive 
functions of analysis, deliberation and decision. It is closely allied to buddhi, which is 
somewhat roughly translated as the faculty of ‘intellect’ or ‘reason’. Buddhi is a subtler 
and more powerful faculty than manas, and is responsible for higher level intellectual 
functions, which require intuition, insight and reflection. The Indian buddhi is in some 
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ways comparable to the Greek noûs, while manas is responsible for lower level discursive 
thought and analysis. But buddhi is still regarded as a manifestation of unconscious māyā, 
albeit the most subtle and refined form which material patterns can assume.  
  
So, to return to the interplay of consciousness and matter, resulting in apparently 
conscious mental events ‒ it is the subtle ‘thought forms’ of the buddhi which allow 
mental events to appear conscious, because the refined buddhi substance is held to be 
‘transparent’ to the light of consciousness. Thus, in order for conscious thoughts and 
perceptual experiences take place, the ‘translucent’ buddhi receives representational 
forms, both perceptual and conceptual, from manas, the ‘organ of cognition’, and it 
receives conscious ‘light’ from cit. So the cognitive structures received from manas are 
illuminated by an external source,  and in this manner specific mental structures can 
appear conscious. 
  
To fully exploit the optical analogy, the conscious representational structures involved in, 
say, visual perception, can be compared to transparent photographic slides. The 
photographic image stored in the film is composed of matter, but it is both 
representational and translucent. Therefore, when the film is held up to an external light 
source, such as the sun, the illuminated representation is analogous to the structures of 
perceptual experience which glow with the sentience of cit. Only the subtle thought-forms 
of buddhi are translucent with the light of cit, while other configurations of matter are 
opaque to this radiance. And this is why minds appear to be the loci of sentience in the 
realm of māyā , while stones and tables cannot assume conscious guise. 
          
Pure consciousness illuminates the material thought-forms of the buddhi, thereby yielding 
the appearance of sentient states that are directed towards particular objects and cognitive 
contents. But from the perspective of pure consciousness this directedness is merely an 
appearance. Consciousness as such is not directed towards these objects, it has no 
intention to illuminate the limited material structures in question, and it is completely 
independent of the mental phenomena upon which its light happens to fall. As exposited 
by Karl Potter,  
 … whereas ordinary awareness not only has an object but also requires it as the 
 occasion for that specific piece of awareness or judgment, pure consciousness has 
 no more relation to its objects than does the sun that shines on everything without 
 being in the least affected by or dependent on things. (1981, p. 93). 
 
 
                                    3. Consciousness and Space 
Potter thus appeals to sunlight as an appropriate metaphor for the non-intentional nature 
of pure consciousness. But an even more fitting analogy is introduced in the following 
passage from Śaṅkara (from the verse section of his work Upadeśasāhasrī, chapter 10, 
‘On the Nature of Consciousness’), which begins with the use of light and progresses to a 
comparison with space: 
 Pure and changeless consciousness I am by nature, devoid of objects to illumine… 
 Beginningless and devoid of attributes, I have neither actions nor their results… 
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 Though in a body, I do not get attached on account of my subtleness, like space  
which, though all pervading, does not get tainted. 
 
Indeed, space provides an extremely apt  metaphor when trying to address the conceptual 
question of ‘how is pure consciousness itself to be understood ‒ what would provide an 
appropriate structural model for such a phenomenon?’ And the highly abstract notion of 
physical space supplies a fascinating answer. To the ancient Greek classification of the 
world as consisting of the four ultimate components of earth, water, fire and air, the 
Indians added a fifth and all pervasive element: ākāśa, which is more or less equivalent to 
classical ‘ether’ or ‘space’. As a basic metaphysical substance, pure consciousness is held 
to possess several essential features in common with this most subtle, and in some 
respects most fundamental, of the physical elements. 
  
Consciousness, like space, is ontologically independent of the objects that may happen to 
fill or occupy it. Thus consciousness of an object is a secondary, non-fundamental mode, 
analogous to space that is occupied. In normal circumstances, we are mostly concerned 
with and cognizant of space with things in it, and this can hide the fact that space itself is 
not ontologically dependent on its occupants. Similarly, in normal circumstances we are 
mostly concerned with the field of consciousness only insofar as it is directed towards 
particular things and contents, insofar as it has an intentional object. And, according to 
the Advaita view, this can obscure the fact that pure consciousness itself does not depend 
on the things that we happen to be conscious of. 
  
Another related aspect in which consciousness is held to resemble space is that, in 
addition to being ontologically self-sustaining, space cannot, even in principle, be affected 
by the objects which fill it. Space itself remains detached and unalterable, even when 
there are things ‘taking it up’. Space is totally inert ‒ it cannot be displaced or disturbed, 
and it does not react in any way with its contents. This is very much in contrast to air, for 
example. Objects occupying a place in the atmosphere must displace the fluid that would 
otherwise occupy the same spatial location. And objects moving through a gaseous 
medium cause turbulence and friction, propagate sound waves and generate heat. The 
atmosphere will chemically interact with the surface of these objects, resulting in 
corrosion and weathering, etc. 
  
In contrast space is absolutely detached, passive and inert. Space cannot be touched or 
altered by the things that fill it. And conversely, space cannot affect its occupants. So it is 
significant that this highly abstract notion of ākāśa or space, rather than air, is used as the 
structural metaphor for consciousness. Clearly, the Indian notion of ākāśa is in many 
ways comparable to the Newtonian conception of absolute space, and hence on this view, 
consciousness itself is structurally analogous to Newton’s classical conception of space as 
an independently real, objective and fundamentally detached manifold (see Schweizer 
2016 for further discussion on this topic). 
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                            4. Comparison with Western Phenomenology  
In sharp contrast to the Advaita view, the phenomenological tradition of Western 
philosophy maintains that all mental states, by their very nature, must be directed towards 
something, and hence pure, non-intentional consciousness is ruled out as theoretically 
impossible. According to the Phenomenological account, consciousness is essentially 
intentional ‒ conscious states are always of or about something (although this 
‘something’ may well be a non-existent object, such as Pegasus or Meinong's ‘Golden 
Mountain’). Husserl’s analysis stems from his modification and development of the 
notion of intentionality as revived by his teacher Franz Brentano, who adopted the notion 
as a basic criterion for distinguishing properly mental from purely physical phenomena. 
And for Brentano as well, consciousness is viewed as essentially intentional, so that the 
very notion of consciousness without an object is seen as self-contradictory.  
 
Thus the Phenomenological stance on the intentionality of consciousness is in opposition 
to the Advaita analysis on two major points. First, the latter claims that the mind and the 
processes by which it is directed to external objects are essentially physical in nature, 
while Brentano uses directedness as the key feature distinguishing minds from mere 
physical systems. Second, Śaṅkara holds that, far from being self-contradictory, 
consciousness without an object is indeed fundamental, while directed states of awareness 
comprise a secondary and dependent mode. In contrast, Husserl maintains that there is an 
indissoluble link between consciousness and ‘meaning’, where this meaning encompasses 
both the semantical directedness of Frege’s Sinn, which does the essential work of 
linguistic reference, as well as a perceptual form of directedness to account for conscious 
experiences of, for example, the-tree-as-perceived, i.e. as seen from a particular 
perspective on a particular occasion. In phenomenological terminology, it is the noema 
which comprises this structured mode of presentation inherent in all episodes of 
consciousness.  
  
Husserl’s position is notoriously intricate and complex, and in the following discussion I 
will rely heavily on Aron Gurwitsch’s (1982) elucidation. Regarding Husserl’s stance on 
the intentionality of consciousness, Gurwitsch states that  
It pertains to the essential nature of acts of consciousness to be related and  
correspond to noemata… consciousness must be defined as a noetic-noematic  
correlation, that is to say, a correlation between items pertaining to two  
heterogeneous planes: on the one hand the plane of temporal psychological events,  
and on the other hand that of… ideal entities that are the noemata, or meanings  
understood in the broader sense [his italics] (p. 65). 
Indeed, according to Gurwitsch, consciousness is then to be characterized by an intrinsic 
duality between psychological events and the correlated ideal objects, where this duality 
takes the place of Descartes’ schism between thinking substance and extended substance. 
       
Thus, while Śaṅkara's views on metaphysically autonomous cit are highly analogous to 
the classical Newtonian conception of absolute space, the contrasting phenomenological 
stance on the intentionality of consciousness is in many ways comparable to Leibniz's 
competing views on physical space. In opposition to the Newtonian camp, Leibniz and his 
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followers put forward an alternative and rather deflationary account. They deny that 
space, as such, has any independent reality. The only things that properly exist are 
material entities and physical events. All spatial assertions should be interpreted not as 
attributing features to space itself, but rather as attributing spatial relations between 
material existents. So objects ‘occupy’ space only to the extent that they bear the salient 
geometrical relations to other bodies and to subparts of themselves as extended objects.  
 
As with the Leibnizean notion of relational space, on Husserl's model of intentional 
consciousness, there is no provision for a substantive or real structure, over and above 
conscious states that are directed, i.e., that are determined by the relation of subject to 
object.  
 
                            5. The Vedāntic Theory of Intentional States 
According to Śaṅkara, pure unconditioned awareness, as such, must be distinguished 
from the particular ‘states of consciousness’ associated with individual agents at specific 
times. Though the underlying story is quite different, these states of consciousness are 
meant to capture the same basic set of phenomena as that which Gurwitsch calls ‘acts of 
consciousness’, viz., particular instances of directed conscious experience. However, the 
Indian view diverges from the Phenomenological analysis with respect to the fundamental 
status of these ordinary states. It argues that the more basic absolute consciousness is a 
necessary precondition for these directed states, if they are to appear conscious. 
Conversely, if these directed states are taken on their own, they remain both unconscious 
and purely material. But, as the following section will maintain, in spite of their extreme 
differences, there is still far wider scope for agreement between the two frameworks than 
might first be suspected. 
 
In marked contrast to the contemporary Western stance, Vedāntic philosophy takes an 
extremely non-metaphorical approach to intentionality. The paradigmatic case is sense 
perception, where the mind is said to literally ‘go out’ (prāpya-kārī, Indich 1980, p. 71) 
through the sense organs into the world and ‘assume the form’ of the objects of 
perception and knowledge. Thus intentional directedness is founded on a veritable ‘noetic 
ray’ (normally described as ‘of the nature of light’, or tejas), which itself makes actual 
contact with the external objects on which the mind is focussed. When the mind thus 
assimilates the form of its external object, this results in an appropriate modification of 
manas, the organ of cognition. This modification of manas, this structural reflection or 
mental likeness, then becomes manifest in the buddhi substance and is illuminated by 
pure consciousness, thus resulting in a particular directed conscious state.  
  
So a conscious state of an individual agent, directed towards a specific object, is treated 
as a metaphysical hybrid. The properly intentional aspect of this hybrid is seen as an 
alteration of the ‘inner instrument’, viz. a modification of manas effected by its literal 
contact with its respective object, which cognitive modification is then transferred to the 
vitreous buddhi substrate. And this component of the hybrid state is purely mechanical or 
‘naturalistic’, a direct consequence of the causal transformations governing the physical 
domain. In more contemporary raiment, this could be seen as a physically implemented 
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formal representation or form of information processing. Then this structural modification 
of the mental substrate, a kind of essentialist representation, is passively illuminated by 
pure consciousness, resulting in a ‘directed’ configuration of matter that appears to be 
sentient. Hence on this account the mind is held to be in motion, and actively extends into 
space, rather than remaining passive in its cognitive container, merely the recipient of 
causal impingements from the outside world. The Vedāntic view does not posit an 
ontological gulf separating mind from matter, and thus the mind can actively ‘pervade’ 
objects and modify itself in response to the structures it contacts.  
  
In contrast, Phenomenological views in particular, and western views in general, tend to 
be highly metaphorical about intentional ‘powers’. The mind is said to be ‘directed 
towards’ objects, it has an intentional ‘aim’, etc., but these locutions tend to lack explicit 
force. To be sure, on Husserl’s view, the noema serve as the vehicle by which the mind is 
directed. It is thus the correlation with the salient noema which gives the mind intentional 
access to an external realm. According to Gurwitsch, “… the perceptual noema must not 
be mistaken for an Idea in the Cartesian sense – that is to say, the substitute for, or 
representative of, a reality only mediately accessible” (p. 68). And again, “… because of 
the intentionality of consciousness, we are in direct contact with the world” (p. 66). Thus 
for Husserl, there is a strong attempt to repudiate the Cartesian heritage which 
preconditions so much of western philosophical thought about the mind.  
  
According to Gurwitsch, “The temporal events called ‘acts of consciousness’ have the 
peculiarity of being actualizations or apprehensions of meanings, the terms 
‘apprehension’ and ‘meaning’ being understood in a very general sense beyond the 
special case of symbolic expressions” (p. 65). It is certainly worth noting that these 
‘actualizations or apprehensions of meanings’ are highly analogous to the Vedantic 
‘modifications of manas’, where both types of structured event are meant to characterize 
the internal or subjective/mental reality of perceiving and understanding.  
  
Indeed, Gurwitsch’s talk of  ‘consciousness’ as a correlation between items from different 
planes, the psychological and the noematic, looks more like the characterization of 
particular, content-laden mental states, rather than a characterization of consciousness 
simplicitor. Apparently both of these correlated items, when taken separately, remain 
unconscious. In this manner, ‘apprehensions of meaning’ and ‘modifications of manas’ 
are reasonably compatible, except that on the Indian model there is only one plane (the 
material) involved. But in terms of intentional structure, and the unconscious status of the 
elements invoked, there is a fair degree of resemblance between the two analyses of 
directed mental states.  
  
Both perspectives could still agree that particular mental states with specific content or 
form must, by their very nature, be intentional. To deny this would seem to be committing 
a kind of self contradiction. And Śaṅkara could potentially agree with the 
phenomenologist insofar as the Vedāntin’s pure, autonomous consciousness is not 
properly a mental state. In this regard, all conscious mental states are intentional for 
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Śaṅkara as well, because pure consciousness is said to illuminate the ‘directed’ 
modifications of matter intrinsic to such states. 
  
So the critical differences obviously emerge with respect to the status and role of pure 
consciousness. The distinctively phenomenological claim that pure, undirected 
consciousness itself is theoretically impossible seems much less compelling than the 
weaker assertion just delineated, viz., that all conscious mental states must be intentional. 
What are the underlying grounds for this additional claim, and what is the force of the 
‘impossibility’? Actuality is generally accepted as a proof of possibility, and in the final 
section I will examine some traditional notions regarding the experiential reality of pure 
consciousness.  
 
                                        6.  Mystical Experience 
Ultimately, the Advaita stance on pure, objectless consciousness cannot be established or 
derived as the conclusion of a deductive argument or intricate chain of philosophical 
reasoning.  According to Śaṅkara, the real nature of consciousness does not follow from 
mere argumentation or rational speculation. And similarly, empirical investigation and 
scientific methodology will also not yield this knowledge. 
 
 Especially in the past 400 years, Western science has made remarkable progress and 
should in no way be downplayed or underestimated ‒ empirical investigation and 
scientific theorizing are extremely powerful tools. However, it is essential to note that 
empirical methods cannot in themselves underwrite a theoretical closure principle. 
Physics provides us with a deep and rigorous grasp of physical reality, but it cannot 
support the further metaphysical claim that physical theory is fully exhaustive, and that 
there is nothing beyond its the scope. Such a closure principle does not follow from 
empirical investigation or scientific experimentation, and it is entirely consistent with 
physical theory that the closure principle is false. Thus if one defines ‘empiricism’ as the 
doctrine that we should only accept that which can be empirically established, then the 
closure principle is in fact inconsistent with empiricism. 
 
Similar considerations also apply to the scope and limits of human reason itself. Without 
the prior intellectual resources of advanced mathematics, there could be no physics. The a 
priori knowledge gained through logic, mathematics, and conceptual analysis provides 
the essential foundation upon which our mighty scientific edifices are constructed. But 
these abstract disciplines are equally incapable of underwriting their own theoretical 
closure principle. It is entirely consistent with logic, mathematics and human reason that 
there are truths which fall outside the scope of these intellectual methods. Thus if one 
defines ‘rationalism’ as the doctrine that we should only accept that which can be 
established on the grounds of reason and logic, then the closure principle is in fact 
inconsistent with rationalism.  
 
Hence the Advaita stance on pure, objectless consciousness is entirely compatible with a 
‘hard-headed’ acceptance of all the truths that can be legitimately derived on the basis of 
both science and reason. But on Śaṅkara's view, the ultimate nature of consciousness 
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cannot be accessed by empirical or rational methods. It is beyond mental processes in 
general and cannot be grasped via an act of cognition, since all cognitive activity 
incorporates the subject/object duality. Pure, autonomous consciousness can only be 
accessed through the mystical experience of direct realization. Because pure, absolute 
consciousness is held to be self-luminous, it can be directly and immediately self-realized  
(see Maharaj, 2018 for an insightful cross-cultural defense of the epistemic value of 
mystical experience). 
 
According to those who have attained this realization, Brahman, the ultimate Reality 
underlying the external universe, is identical to Ᾱtman, the ultimate Reality underlying 
the inner self. Ᾱtman is Brahman (ayam Ᾱtmā Brahma). Thou Art That (tat tvam asi). 
The non-duality of pure consciousness without an object thus closes the circle ‒ inner and 
outer are experienced as one. And although it is held to transcend conceptual 
understanding or linguistic characterization, this singular reality is canonically depicted as 
sat, cit, ānanda ‒ existence, consciousness, bliss. 
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